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Abstract
This paper explores the impact dividend taxes exert on the divi-
dends repatriated from foreign aliates to their German parent com-
pany. Based on an augmented Lintner model of rms' dividend payout
decisions, the paper focusses on cross-border intra-rm dividend pay-
ments of wholly-owned foreign aliates in the manufacturing sector.
Firm-level data from the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of
the Deutsche Bundesbank is used. Results rstly signal the validity
of the original Lintner model for cross-border intra-rm dividend pay-
ments of German aliates abroad, although the target payout ratio
and the degree of dividend smoothing drops substantially once time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Secondly, results
from an augmented Lintner model imply that increases in dividend
taxes indeed have a statistically signicant negative impact on the ex-
pected value of dividends repatriated: Evaluated at the overall mean
dividend payment a one percentage point increase in the dividend tax
rate would decrease dividends repatriated by about 3.5 percent. Eval-
uated at the mean of positive dividend payments a semi-elasticity of
-1.6 is derived.
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 Non technical summary
The aim of this study is to analyse whether dividend taxes exert a statis-
tically and economically relevant impact on the expected value of dividends
repatriated from foreign aliates to their German parent company over the
1999-2005 period. The paper contributes to the literature as evidence on the
impact dividend taxes have on cross-border intra-rm dividend payments is
rather scarce. This is especially the case for countries applying the exemp-
tion system in international taxation, like Germany.
The analysis is based on data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank's Micro-
database Direct Investment (MiDi) database. Specically, data on German
foreign aliates in the manufacturing sector which are directly and wholly-
owned by a German parent company is used for the analysis. Host countries
included are the EU member countries (as of 2007) and the most advanced
Non-EU OECD countries. In total, information contained in yearly data on
587 German aliates abroad over 7 years is explored.
The analysis is based on the widely known Lintner model of dividend smooth-
ing, which is frequently seen as a relevant description of rms' dividend
payout behavior. The Lintner model is a partial adjustment model sug-
gesting that rms have a target dividend payment, which is a fraction of
its current earnings. The model leads to an empirical specication relating
dividends paid to lagged dividends and current earnings of the rm. How-
ever, the basic Lintner model has been established for dividend payments
to public shareholders, but not the intra-rm case and moreover it does not
include taxes as determinants of dividend payments. Thus, two issues prior
to exploring the tax eect within the Lintner framework arise: (i) it has
to be established that the basic Lintner model also is suitable to analyze
cross-border intra-rm payout behavior; and (ii) the Lintner model has to
be augmented to include taxes as determinants of dividend payments.
Empirical analysis of the basic Lintner model implies that this model seems
to be valid for analysing cross-border intra-rm dividend payments, even if
emphasis is put on the isolation of "true state dependence" in payout be-
havior. The existence of "true state dependence" implies that payment of
dividends in earlier years has a genuine behavioural eect on future divi-
dend policy, as suggested by the Lintner model. Yet, compared to studies
analysing the public shareholder sphere, the target-payout ratio is lower and
the speed of adjustment is higher in the intra-rm context. From a more
substantive perspective these dierences are in line with the theoretical view
suggesting that dividend payments are less relevant for signalling and con-
trolling (agency) aims in the parent-subsidiary sphere.
Concerning the second issue raised, the basic Lintner model is augmented
in a way that the target dividend payment is not merely a fraction of the
rm's current earnings but also depends on other factors like the taxation
of dividends paid, the rm size or the debt level of the aliate. Estimating
empirically the augmented Lintner model reveals that taxes do play a signif-icant role for the repatriation behavior. In particular, the results imply that
a one percentage point decrease in the dividend tax rate would result in a
3.5 (1.6) percent increase in dividends repatriated if the coecients derived
are evaluated at the overall mean value of dividend payments (mean value
of positive dividend payments).Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Diese Studie untersucht, ob Dividendensteuern sowohl aus statistischis-
cher als auch aus  okonomischer Sicht eine relevante Wirkung auf das Vol-
umen von nach Deutschland repatriierten Dividenden haben. Bisher liegt
kaum empirische Evidenz  uber den Einuss von Dividendensteuern auf intra-
Firmen Dividendenzahlungen  uber die Grenze vor. Dies ist insbesondere f ur
L ander wie Deutschland der Fall, welche das Freistellungsverfahren in der
Internationalen Besteuerung anwenden. Die Analyse st utzt sich auf Daten
aus der "Microdatabase Direct Investment" (MiDi) der Deutschen Bundes-
bank. Es werden in der Analyse Daten  uber direkte Deutsche Tochterge-
sellschaften des verarbeitenden Sektors im Ausland verwendet, welche zu
hundert Prozent im Eigentum einer Deutschen Muttergesellschaft stehen.
Als Gastl ander werden alle EU Mitgliedstaaten mit Stand 2007, sowie die
h ochstentwickelten nicht-EU OECD L ander inkludiert. Insgesamt wird In-
formation aus j ahrlichen Daten  uber 587 Deutsche Tochterunternehmen im
Ausland  uber sieben Jahre (1999 - 2005) verwendet.
Die Analyse st utzt sich auf das Lintner Modell der Dividendenpolitik, welches
die Dividendenzahlungen eines Unternehmens in Abh angigkeit der laufenden
Gewinne und fr uherer Dividendenzahlungen analysiert. Das Lintner Modell
ist ein partielles Anpassungsmodell, welches impliziert, dass Unternehmen
einen bestimmten Anteil des Gewinnes als Dividendenzahlung anstreben.
Dieses Modell resultiert in einer empirischen Spezikation, welche die gezahlte
Dividende zu den im Vorjahr gezahlten Dividenden und den laufenden Gewin-
nen und Verlusten in Beziehung setzt. Nachdem das Lintner Modell f ur
die Erkl arung von Dividendenzahlungen an individuelle Anteilseigner en-
twickelt wurde, nicht aber f ur intra-Firmen Dividendenzahlungen und es
zudem Steuern als Determinanten von Dividendenzahlungen nicht enth alt,
m ussen bevor der Eekt von Steuern mithilfe des Lintner Modells analysiert
werden kann zwei Punkte gekl art werden: Erstens muss festgestellt wer-
den, ob das urspr ungliche Lintner Modell auch f ur die Analyse des Divi-
dendenzahlungsverhaltens im grenz uberschreitenden intra-Firmen Kontext
geeignet ist. Zweitens muss das Lintner Modell um Steuern als Determinan-
ten von Dividendenzahlungen erweitert werden.
Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass das Lintner Modell geeignet ist, um
das Dividendenzahlungsverhalten im grenz"uberschreitenden intra-Firmen
Kontext zu analysieren, sogar wenn Pfadabh angigkeit in der Dividendenpoli-
tik explizit ber ucksichtigt wird. Pfadabh angigkeit impliziert, dass Dividen-
denzahlungen in fr uheren Jahren eine direkte Auswirkung auf zuk unftige
Dividendenzahlungen haben, wie es das Lintner Modell vorhersagt. Je-
doch zeigt sich, dass im Vergleich mit den Ergebnissen von Studien in
Bezug auf individuelle Anteilseigner die Anpassungsgeschwindigkeit h oher
ist. Dieser Unterschied ist konsistent mit theoretischen Modellen, welche
eine geringe Relevanz von Dividendenzahlungen zum Zweck des Signal-
isierens (signalling) und der Kontrolle (agency) im Mutter-Tochter Zusam-menhang aufzeigen.
Um dem zweiten Punkt Rechnung zu tragen, wird das Lintner Modell er-
weitert, so dass die angestrebte Dividendenzahlung nicht nur eine Funk-
tion des Gewinnes (Verlustes) ist, sondern auch von anderen Faktoren,
wie zum Beispiel der Besteuerung der ausgesch utteten Dividende, der Un-
ternehmensgr oe oder dem Verschuldungsgrad der Auslandstochter abh angt.
Die empirische Sch atzung des erweiterten Lintner Modells ergibt, dass Steuern
eine signikante Rolle f ur das Repatriierungsverhalten spielen.
Die Ergebnisse der empirischjen Analyse implizieren, dass eine Senkung
des Dividendensteuersatzes um einen Prozentpunkt zu einer Steigerung der
repatriierten Dividende um 3.5 (1.6) Prozent f uhren w urde, wenn die Regres-
sionskoezienten am Mittelwert der gezahlten Dividende (am Mittelwert der
Dividenden mit positiven Euro-Wert) evaluiert werden.Contents
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4 Summary 221 Introduction
Dividend repatriations of foreign aliates to domestic parent companies
and their determinants, respectively, are an important topic, both from
micro- and macroeconomic viewpoints (e.g. Altshuler and Grubert, 2002).
From the micro-perspective the choice of whether to repatriate earnings
from a foreign subsidiary is a relevant decision in multinational nancial
management. From the macroeconomic viewpoint, the timing and extent
of dividend repatriation may have direct consequences for the level of tax
revenues, employment and investment in the home and the host country
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Thus, if dividend taxes signicantly
determine rms' repatriation policies, they may also be directly connected
with micro- and macroeconomic consequences.
It is a stylized fact that high dividend taxes reduce dividends paid (see
Gordon and Dietz, 2006). This tax eect is predominantly established in
studies dealing with dividend payments to public shareholders. In contrast,
evidence on the impact dividend taxes have on cross-border intra-rm divi-
dend payments is rather scarce, even though some evidence is available for
credit system countries, the US in particular. Evidence for exemption sys-
tem countries, like Germany1, is even scarcer. However, even in the latter
case dividend taxes may impact on the volume of dividends repatriated as,
for instance, host countries of FDI might levy withholding taxes on repatri-
ated prots.
This paper analyzes the impact dividend taxes exert on the dividends
repatriated from foreign aliates to their German parent company. The
eect dividend taxes have on intra-rm cross-border dividend repatriation
policies can be analyzed by a new and powerful dataset, namely the Micro-
database Direct Investment (MiDi) provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
This database includes rm-level data of German parent companies and their
aliates abroad. Specically, based on the Lintner model of rms' dividend
payout decisions (see Lintner, 1956) the paper focusses on the cross-border
dividend payments of wholly-owned foreign aliates (direct participating
interests, Lipponer, 2008) in the manufacturing sector to their parent com-
pany in Germany.
The analysis is based on the Lintner model, as this model is consistent
with a second empirical stylized fact about rms' dividend decisions, namely
the dividend smoothing behavior of rms (see e.g. Gordon and Dietz, 2006).
Moreover this model is frequently seen as \the best description of the divi-
dend setting process available." (Benartzi et al., 1997, p. 1032) It has to be
noted, however, that the original intention of the Lintner model was not to
explain cross-border intra-rm dividend payments. Rather, the focus was
1Germany eectively applies the exemption system also prior to 2001 by exempting
dividends via double tax treaties and having an extensive treaty network (see Grubert,
2001).
1to describe dividend payments of rms to public shareholders. Additionally,
the \basic" Lintner model does not directly contain taxes as a possible de-
terminant of dividend policy. Thus, two issues arise: Firstly, the empirical
relevance of the Lintner model for the specic dividend payment decision
considered in this paper has to be explored. Secondly, the basic Lintner
model has to be augmented to capture the impact of dividend taxes on the
expected value of dividend payments.
With respect to the rst issue raised, we nd that the Lintner model
is indeed suitable for analyzing cross-border intra-rm dividend payments,
although the target payout ratio and the degree of dividend smoothing are
relatively low and the adjustment to the target payout ratio occurs rather
quickly. Yet, one has to bear in mind that our analysis also shows that the
expected value of dividends remitted is higher for rms that initially pay
a higher dividend. Based on an "augmented" Lintner model we nd that,
besides the variables stressed by Lintner and the initial dividend payment,
taxes as well as an aliate's indebtedness and size signicantly determine
dividend repatriation decisions. Specically, the results imply that a one
percentage point decrease in the dividend tax rate would increase dividends
repatriated by 3.5 percent if evaluated at the overall mean dividend payment
(semi-elasticity of about -3.5). Evaluated at the mean of positive dividend
payments a semi-elasticity of -1.6 is derived. These results are broadly com-
parable to the values derived by prior studies focusing on Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs) from the US.
The paper is structured as follows: Section two outlines the basic Lintner
model and provides an overview of studies analyzing its empirical relevance.
Further, section two includes some methodological considerations for ana-
lyzing dividend decisions and it elaborates on the usefulness of the basic
Lintner model for analyzing the cross-border intra-rm dividend decisions
of German companies. Section three presents results from the estimation of
an augmented Lintner model which also captures various additional deter-
minants of rms' dividend policies, notably dividend taxes. The augmented
Lintner model is thereby introduced, and the results of related literature as
well as the regression results are presented. Section four summarizes.
2 The basic Lintner model
2.1 The model framework
The basic Lintner model is essentially a \partial adjustment model". Thus,
the model begins with the following equation describing dividend payments
(based on Lintner, 1956, p. 107):
DIVit = d(DIV 
it   DIVit 1) + it (1)
2with: i = rm i, t = year, d = speed of adjustment coecient, DIVit =
dividend payment of rm i in year t, DIV 
it = desired (long-run) dividend
payment, it = error term.
In a panel context, the error-term is written as it = ci +t +#it with t
being time-specic eects usually modeled as time dummies, ci are (random
or xed) rm-specic time invariant eects and #it is the remainder error
term. Substituting DIV 
it by rProfitit with Profitit being the current
year's earnings after taxes of the rm and 1  r > 0 being the desired
long-run target payout ratio and rearranging gives
DIVit = drProfitit + (1   d)DIVit 1 + it (2)
The most important implications of the Lintner model given in Equation
(1) and Equation (2) can be summarized as follows (based on Marsh and
Merton, 1987; Bessler and Ellermann, 2004):
1. After tax earnings are the most important determinant of dividends.
Recursively solving Equation (2) shows that current and past values
of Profitit are the main determinants of dividends.
2. Firms' managers focus on dividend changes.
This is directly derivable from Equation (1). Lintner (1956) formulates
his model in this way. Yet he conducts his empirical analysis based on
Equation (2).
3. Firms have a desired, long-run payout ratio (r).
This implies that r derivable from Equation (2) is signicantly dierent
from zero.
4. Firms smooth dividend payments.
Dividend changes follow shifts in earnings, yet due to technological,
institutional and psychological inertia, rms will smooth dividends.
In other words, the level of dividends paid in t   1 has an impact on
dividends paid in t.2
2.2 Survey of existing studies applying the basic Lintner
model
We have separated the empirical studies using the basic Lintner model into
two categories: the rst deals with the dividend payout in general, mainly
involving dividends paid to public shareholders, and the second specically
2A number of theoretical models explain why rms smooth dividends. Among them
are signalling and agency models. The rst sees dividends as a means for managers to
signal \true protability" to shareholders and the latter argues that the board of directors
requires dividend payments as a device to control selsh managers (see Gordon and Dietz,
2006).
3concerns cross-border intra-rm dividend payments. The former papers are
further detailed into early studies, including the seminal work of Lintner,
recent studies and studies dealing with German rms. We provide three
measures to characterize the studies: the estimated long-run payout ratio
(r), the speed of adjustment coecient (d) and the median adjustment lag
(). The latter shows the time period necessary to close the gap between the
actual and the target dividend payment by 50 percent after a disequilibrating
shock has occurred.3 Table (1) in the appendix shows the results derived.4
2.2.1 Public shareholder sphere
Lintner (1956) uses aggregate data from national accounts. He reports a
speed of adjustment coecient of 30 percent and a target payout ratio of
50 percent. The median adjustment lag is about two years. These results
are only slightly altered in the study of Fama and Babiak (1968, p. 1134
Panel A), using rm-level data in order to better reect the individual rm
decision. Brittain (1964) provides another set of results by generalizing
Lintner's model via introducing depreciation allowances, personal income
tax rates on dividends and other explanatory variables, based on aggregated
data (38 annual observations 1920-1960, excluding 1936-38). The results of
Brittain dier markedly from the average reported in Table (1), as the speed
of adjustment is rather low (0.15) and the averaged long-run payout ratio is
the highest of all studies surveyed (0.90).
Recent studies are those of Van Eije and Megginson (2008), who use
Data-Stream and Worldscope rm-level data with a focus on European coun-
tries and Skinner (2008), who uses data on US rms from Compustat. Van
Eije and Megginson (2008) report a higher speed of adjustment coecient
and a target payout ratio comparable to that of the Lintner benchmark.
Skinner (2008) reports a markedly lower speed of adjustment coecient and
thus a higher median adjustment lag (see Table (1)).
Studies based on German rm-level data are Behm and Zimmermann
(1993), Da Silva et al. (2004) and Andres et al. (2009). Behm and Zimmer-
mann (1993) use data on 32 major German rms between 1962 and 1988.
While the speed of adjustment is much lower than Lintner's, the averaged
long-run payout ratio is almost equal. Da Silva et al. (2004) use data on
221 listed rms in Germany for the period 1984-93, for which at least ve
years of accounting data exist. They nd a slightly lower speed of adjust-
ment than Lintner (1956), but a similar payout ratio. Andres et al. (2009)
3The median adjustment lag () is calculated as (ln(0:5)=ln(1   d)) (see Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1998).
4Most studies focus on the US and other highly developed OECD countries. With
respect to other countries, for example Glen et al. (1995) found that the speed of adjust-
ment lies between 40 percent in Zimbabwe and 90 percent in Turkey and the target payout
ratios are between 30 and 40 percent. Adaoglu (2000) points out a speed of adjustment
of 100 percent in Turkey with a payout ratio of 50 percent.
4use data on 220 industrial and commercial rms in Germany. In particular,
their nding points to a more exible dividend policy as rms are willing
to cut the dividend when protability is only temporarily down. The re-
sults of Andres et al. (2009) are consistent with a lower degree of dividend
smoothing of German rms compared to rms from the US or the UK.
2.2.2 Cross-border intra-rm sphere
The Lintner model is also used to model cross-border intra-rm dividends.
Two studies (Desai et al., 2001, 2006) are based on rm-level data (data on
dividends repatriated from US aliates abroad). A third study (Lehmann
and Mody, 2004) uses data from current accounts and analyzes inter alia
aggregate dividend payments from abroad to Germany. Compared to the
results for dividends paid to public shareholders, the speed of adjustment
coecients of these studies are much higher, and therefore the median ad-
justment lags are lower. Thus, these results imply that dividend smoothing
is not as relevant in the cross-border intra-rm case as it is for the public
shareholder sphere.5
Whereas Desai et al. (2001, 2006) report target payout ratios which are
comparable to those reported for dividend payments to public shareholders,
the target payout ratio derived by Lehmann and Mody (2004) is virtually
zero. Hence, only the results derived by Desai et al. (2001, 2006) favor the
validity of the Lintner model for the cross-border intra-rm dividend case.
Overall, the empirical studies reported in Table (1) are in favor of the
Lintner model. However, smoothing seems to be much more important
for the public shareholder sphere than for cross-border intra-rm dividend
payments. Nevertheless, our summary of results also implies considerable
heterogeneity between studies, especially concerning the speed of adjustment
and hence the median adjustment lags.
It must be noted that the studies included in Table (1) are based on the
linear OLS estimator. Yet, as dividend payments of an individual rm can-
not be negative, the dependent variable is left censored. Using the OLS esti-
mator for rm-level data therefore probably leads to inconsistent estimates,
as the conditional expectation of the model is non-linear in the parameters
and the regressors (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 525). Hence, an estimator for
censored and corner-solution data, the Tobit estimator, is better suited for
testing the Lintner hypothesis of dividend smoothing in these cases. Indeed,
the study of Desai et al. (2001) also applies this estimator and nds a speed
of adjustment coecient of 0.67 / 0.77 and a target payout ratio of 0.88 /
0.37.
5Among the early papers applying the Lintner model in the cross-border intra-rm
context is Scaperlanda and Mauer (1972). According to Hines and Hubbard (1990), Sca-
perlanda and Mauer also nd much higher speeds of adjustment than found in studies for
payouts to public shareholders.
52.3 Relevance of the basic Lintner model for cross-border
intra-rm dividend payments of German rms
2.3.1 Methodological considerations
As previously outlined, persistence in dividend payments is a crucial feature
of the Lintner model. More specically, the Lintner model postulates what
can be called \true state dependence" in terms of Heckman (1981a, p. 91).
Thus, the payment of dividends in year t0 has a genuine behavioral eect
on future dividend policy in the sense that an otherwise equal rm which
does not pay a dividend in year t0 will behave dierently in the future. The
coecient on the lagged dividend variable in the Lintner model is intended to
isolate true state dependence and to signal the extent of dividend smoothing
behavior of rms.
Yet, rms' dividend policies also dier due to rm-specic, unobserved
heterogeneity. In particular, for rm-specic reasons not related to the be-
havioral smoothing eect postulated by Lintner, rms pay (or do not pay)
dividends. In this case, past dividend payments have no eect on the prob-
ability of paying dividends in the future (Baltagi, 2008, p. 217) and thus
they are not part of an equation modelling dividend payments. Rather, the
eect is captured by rm-specic time invariant eects.
Panel data allow us to include both a lagged dependent variable cap-
turing the behavioral eect, as well as unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. rm-
specic time invariant eects) in the same empirical model. Loudermilk
(2007) stresses that unobserved aliate-level heterogeneity is potentially
important in explaining repatriated dividends. If one does not control for
this unobserved heterogeneity - that is, by using a pooled estimator instead
of a panel data estimator, the lagged dividend variable in the Lintner model
acts as a proxy for such unobserved eects. An upward bias in the eect of
the lagged dependent variable arises (see Hsiao, 2003, p. 218 for examples).
Improper treatment of unobserved heterogeneity gives rise to a relationship
between past and future dividend payments which is \spurious" (\spurious
state dependence") in terms of Heckman (1981a). In this case a signicant
(and positive) eect of the lagged endogenous variable in the Lintner model
may not be related to behavioral dividend smoothing as postulated by Lint-
ner (1956). Thus, neglecting unobserved aliate-level heterogeneity results
in a biased estimate of the degree of dividend smoothing.6
6So far, only a few empirical studies have attempted to examine the inuence of mod-
elling rm-specic, unobserved heterogeneity on the degree of smoothing behavior in the
Lintner model. A notable exception is Loudermilk (2007). She examines the determi-
nation of the share of payouts to rms' shareholders made as share repurchases versus
traditional cash dividends within the Lintner framework. In doing so, she explicitly mod-
els the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the coecient of the lagged dependent
variable. Moreover, dealing with rms' dividend policies, Benito and Young (2003) also
stress the importance of modelling unobserved heterogeneity. They analyze the incidence
of dividend omissions and cuts as functions of nancial characteristics including cash ow,
6Several approaches are proposed in the literature to estimate dynamic
non-linear panel data models with rm-specic unobserved heterogeneity.
One crucial point therein is to cope with the \initial conditions problem",
which occurs when the rst period for which we observe an outcome is
not the beginning of the underlying stochastic process (Benito and Young,
2003, p. 542). However, presample information might determine the ob-
served in-sample values of the endogenous variable. This issue is aggravated
if the initial condition is correlated with the time invariant rm-specic ef-
fects. Then, it is important to model the relationship of the initial condition
(DIVit0) with the rm-specic time invariant eects (ci). A rst approach
is to consider the DIVit0 as uncorrelated with ci. Yet, this assumption basi-
cally implies that DIVit0 is exogenously given and xed, which might not be
the case. A second approach, which models DIVit0 as correlated with ci, is
to approximate, for example via a Probit model, the conditional distribution
of DIVit0 given ci and the exogenous variables (Heckman, 1981b). A third
approach is to model ci as a function of DIVit0 and the exogenous vari-
ables (Wooldridge, 2005). The latter approach has the advantage of being
applicable to corner-solution problems. Thus, in this study we apply this es-
timator.7 Specically, we estimate the following corner-solution model (see
Wooldridge, 2002, p. 542f):8
DIVit = max(0;drProfitit + (1   d)DIVit 1 + it) (3)
with: it = ci+t+#it and #it  Normal(0;2
#), t = 1,...,T. As mentioned,
the initial conditions problem is handled by specifying a distribution for ci
given DIVit0 and the exogenous variables. Thereby either the \Chamberlain-
approach" (Equation (4)) or the \Mundlak-approach" (Equation (5)) may
be applied. The rst approach models ci as a function of DIVit0 and of
all exogenous explanatory variables across all time periods. The second
approach includes the time average of all exogenous explanatory variables
together with DIVit0 (see Wooldridge, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002, p. 487).
c
DIVit0;Profit;
= a + bDIVit0 + mProfiti + i (4)




= a + bDIVit0 + mpi: + i (5)
with pi: = 1=T
PT
t=1 Profitit.
leverage, investment opportunities, investment and company size.
7The approach of Heckman (1981b) is for binary endogenous variables.
8The denitions of variables included in Equation (3) are the same as those in section
(2.1).
7In both cases, coecients of time-constant exogenous variables, like
country dummies, are not identied if included in Equation (4) or Equa-
tion (5) as well as in Equation (3) (Wooldridge, 2005, p. 44). Substitution
of ci in Equation (3) by the right side of Equation (4) or Equation (5) gives
the corner-solution model which can be estimated by a standard random
eects Tobit estimator. These estimates thus control for rm-specic un-
observed eects and measure inter alia how within-rm changes in current
earnings impact on dividends paid, given the level of lagged dividends paid
(also see Chauvin and Kraay, 2007).
The Wooldridge (2005) estimator has the advantage of allowing the
calculation of Average Partial Eects (APEs) from the estimated Tobit-
coecients. As argued by Wooldridge (2002) or Loudermilk (2007) in the
case of corner-solution applications - such as, for example, the repatriation
decision of foreign aliates, the Tobit coecient is not the parameter of in-
terest.9 Rather, for an economic interpretation of the estimates one should
derive APEs which are better suited for evaluating the economic importance
of variables. In particular, APEs can be derived from the Tobit coecients
following the procedure given in Wooldridge (2005, p. 49f). For continuous
variables, this results in summing the partial eect variable xl has on the









with:  being the cumulative normal distribution function, x0 being the
matrix of regressors evaluated at the mean values,  being the vector of Tobit
estimates and l being the Tobit estimate for regressor l;  = (2
# + 2
)1=2.
Note, that for the pooled Tobit estimator, which neglects the presence
of ci, the APE is equal to the partial eect, i.e it is equal to E(y)=xl
evaluated at a suitable (mean) value of xl (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 24
and p. 530). Standard errors of the APEs can be derived using the \delta
method" or a \bootstrapping approach" (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 495).
It should be noted that the Wooldridge estimator requires a balanced
panel (Wooldridge, 2005, p. 42f; Poggi, 2007). Yet, as in the case of us-
ing an unbalanced panel, applying a balanced sub-panel might lead to a
selection bias of the estimates. A simple procedure to give an indication of
the likelihood of a selection bias is to compare estimates derived from the
balanced panel with those derived from the unbalanced panel. If dierent
results are derived, this is an indication of the presence of selection bias
9Corner solution problems where the mass point is due to maximization behavior have
to be separated from censored data problems where the mass point is due to sampling.
These two problems have dierent conditional expectations of interest (see Wooldridge,
2002, chapter 16).
8(Verbeek, 2008, p. 178f).
To analyze the relevance of the Lintner model for dividend payments
to German parent companies from their wholly-owned foreign aliates we
apply both the pooled Tobit estimator and the Wooldridge (2005) estimator
for dynamic Tobit models. With respect to the latter estimator we generate
a balanced panel of dividend payments in the years 1999 to 2005. Dierences
in the results concerning the eect of the lagged dependent variable using
the pooled estimator and the Wooldridge estimator on the balanced estima-
tor are an indication of the upward bias of the degree of dividend smoothing
due to neglected, unobserved rm-specic heterogeneity. As already men-
tioned, markedly dierent results between the pooled Tobit estimates for
the balanced and the unbalanced panel would point towards the presence of
sample selection problems.10
2.3.2 Dividend data
This study is based on the MiDi database made available by the Deutsche
Bundesbank (e.g. Lipponer, 2008). Although the MiDi database does not di-
rectly provide gures for dividends paid by aliates abroad to their German
parents, it provides sucient information to allow the calculation of divi-
dend payments according to the rules of the \Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch"
(HGB; German Code of Commercial Law). German parent companies have
to deliver inter alia balance sheet data to the MiDi database according to
HGB standards.11 The method of dividend calculation applied here there-
fore follows HGB standards. Dividends repatriated in year t are proxied as
follows12:
prot or loss for the nancial year (after taxes and prior to prot
distribution and osetting of losses carried forward)13 in t [p32]
+ prot or loss carried forward from t-1 to t [p31]
10All estimators are implemented using Stata version 10.0 (tobit and xttobit commands).
Partial eects for the pooled Tobit estimator are derived using Stata 8.0 and the dtobit
command.
11The form which is sent to the German parent rms includes the following state-
ment: \The reported gures must be based on the balance sheet according to the rules
of the country of residence of the aliate, prior to the allocation of the net income.
...Concerning the allocation of the balance sheet items in the form, the denitions and
the classications for the balance sheet of a German joint stock company have to be
applied in an analogous way." (Source: Anlage K3 zur AWV, Blatt 2; Vermoegen Gebi-
etsansaessiger in fremden Wirtschaftsgebieten, Deutsche Bundesbank. Translated by the
authors.)
12The MiDi code is given in squared brackets.
13This variable represents the level of current year's earnings after corporate income
taxes and any tax-motivated prot shifting activities of MNEs.
9+ withdrawal of capital reserves from t to t+1 [p29]
+ withdrawal of revenue reserves from t to t+1 [p30]
{ addition to revenue reserves from t to t+1 [p30]
= prot / loss according to the balance sheet
{ prots carried forward into t+1 [forward lag of p31]
= dividend payment in t
Due to the approximation of the repatriated dividends, several aspects
have to be noted:
i) In the calculation of the dividend variable it is checked whether prots
carried forward and prots according to balance sheet are larger than
zero in order to avoid adding losses carried forward.
ii) Dividends are set to zero in three cases: (a) if prots according to
balance sheet are zero or if balance sheet losses are given; (b) if losses
are carried forward and (c) if the derived dividend is negative since
the balance sheet prot is smaller than the prots carried forward but
both values are positive.
iii) Outliers, dened as dividend payments larger or smaller than three
standard deviations from the mean value, are dropped. The same
outlier analysis is conducted for variable p32.
iv) The MiDi database provides balance sheet data converted into Euros.
As we use data from balance sheets of dierent years (e.g. t and
t+1) the issue of exchange rate stability arises. Balance sheet data
in local currencies are not given in the MiDi database. Moreover, the
application of the bilateral Euro exchange rate to convert the data
into local currencies is complicated for several reasons: (a) dierent
aliates have dierent accounting dates so that the Euro exchange
rate to be applied varies over aliates within a particular host country
and a given year; (b) as the balance sheet items are expressed in 1,000
Euros, they might be rounded values. Hence, a perfect replication of
the balance sheet data in local currency would not be possible even if
the \correct" Euro exchange rate were known; (c) a substantial share of
aliates report their balance sheet data to the Deutsche Bundesbank
in dierent currencies in dierent years.14 Given these problems, a
perfect transformation of the Euro data into local currencies is not
14For example, the database contains aliates which report their balance sheet state-
ment denominated in the local currency of the host country in year t, in Deutschmarks in
10possible. To cope with the exchange rate stability problem we calculate
an average Euro exchange rate using the exchange rate data provided
by the MiDi. The exchange rate used (Forexjt) is based on the average
over the exchange rates used by all aliates which have their balance
sheet statements denominated in the local currency of the host country
in a given year. Thus, aliates which use other currencies (usually
the Deutschmark and the Euro) are not included in this average. We
primarily use this variable to construct an additional control variable
in the regressions. Yet, as a robustness check we also transform the
data using this exchange rate before (to end up with data in local
currencies) and after (to end up with data denominated in Euros again)
the calculation of the dividend variable and estimate the model with
these \converted" data.
v) To check the plausibility of the derived dividend data it is compared
with the dividend data provided in the Deutsche Bundesbank's DiKap
database. The latter provides eective (positive) dividends received by
a German parent aggregated over all its foreign aliates in a partic-
ular host country and a particular year. The gures derived from the
MiDi database for 2003, 2004 and 2005 are consistent with those given
in the DiKap database. In particular, the reported average (positive)
dividend payment the German parent companies included in our sam-
ple receive from all of their foreign aliates according to the DiKap
database is (in Euro 1000) 4904.95 (2003), 4934.69 (2004) and 4283.21
(2005). The corresponding values derived from the Midi database are
3879.07 (2003), 3476.69 (2004) and 4399.65 (2005).15
We analyze repatriated prots from German aliates abroad in the man-
ufacturing sector. The reason for the exclusion of service sector industries
is that the balance sheet data of these industries (e.g. holding companies,
nancial intermediaries) would inate the balance sheet items. Yet, their
parent companies may be active in any industry, whether it be manufactur-
ing or services, i.e. they also comprise German holding companies. The host
countries of German FDI considered are the EU-15 (without Germany), the
new EU member states (NMS-12) and all non-EU OECD-countries exclud-
ing Mexico, South Korea and, in the analysis in section 3, due to missing
tax data, Iceland and Turkey.
t+1 and in Euros in t+2. Transforming the Euro data using the exchange rate data given
by the Midi database would result in using balance sheet items (e.g. p32) denominated in
local currency of the host country and in Deutschmarks (e.g. forward lag of p31) in the
calculation of the repatriated dividend in year t.
15For the \converted" dividend data the DiKap values are (in Euro 1000) 4511.35,
4635.55 and 2923.92. The corresponding Midi values are 4121.09, 3467.66 and 3795.66.
11Only those aliates abroad which are wholly and directly owned by an
incorporated German parent company (direct participation16) are included
in the sample. This is for two reasons: First, to cope with agency prob-
lems which might be reduced by using wholly owned aliates (e.g. Da Silva
et al., 2004) and, second, to have to model only one bilateral relationship
(Germany and the respective host country of FDI). Thus, we neither model
relationships between an aliate and other aliates of a common parent,
nor between an aliate and its several parent companies.17
The sample spans the time period from 1999 to 2005. These years have
been chosen because data on capital reserves contained in the MiDi database
are plausibility checked with the beginning of 1999 by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank. 2005 is the most recent year in the MiDi database when the analysis
has been undertaken. In the unbalanced panel, only those rms showing
positive or zero dividend payments in at least three consecutive years have
been included. This is done to avoid aliates re-entering the sample after
having disappeared from it. The balanced panel covers rms showing posi-
tive or zero dividends in the seven consecutive years from 1999 to 2005.18
All aliates included are legal entities. Yet, whether an aliate is in-
corporated cannot be ascertained from the MiDi database. It thus cannot
be ruled out that the aliates abroad may also include partnerships and
private companies, but according to information provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank these are only exceptional cases. Hence, the vast majority of
aliates is incorporated. Moreover, only aliates with a balance sheet total
of at least 3 mn Euro are included to cope with changes in the balance sheet
threshold over time. To sum up, denitions and sources of our variables used
in the empirical analysis are given in Table (2) in the appendix.
16Lipponer (2008, FN 5 and 6): \In the case of German foreign direct investment,
it is the resident investors which are subject to reporting requirements (...). Aliated
investors are those which have come together specically to establish the investment en-
terprise, which pursue economic interests jointly by holding participating interests in one
or more enterprises or who are closely related to each other (direct related by blood or
marriage) or are connected with each other as dened in section 15 of the Companies Act
(Aktiengesetz)." A direct investment enterprise is classed as \dependent if the Investor
holds more than 50% of the shares or voting rights. If a \dependent" enterprise holds a
100% participating interest in another enterprise than this enterprise and any additional
enterprise fullling the condition of a 100% participating interest are also regarded as
\dependent"."
17The eects dividend taxes have on indirect participating interests are analyzed by
Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008).
18In the sample used in the present study, 85 percent of aliates have been included in
the MiDi database since 1996 and thus the dividend generation process started well before
1999, the rst year of observation.
122.3.3 Descriptive evidence on rm-level data
Table (3) in the appendix shows descriptive evidence on the rm-level data
taken from the MiDi database. The distinction between dividend payers and
non-payers (about 47 percent of our sample) clearly reveals similarities with
regard to the size of aliates and FDI stock, but also marked dierences with
regard to indebtedness, current earnings and prots according to the balance
sheet. In particular, prots according to the balance sheet are negative for
non-payers. The mean dividend paid is 1.2 mn (overall) and 2.7 mn (payers)
Euro. For the \converted" dividend variable the means are 1.1 mn and 2.3
mn, respectively.
2.3.4 Econometric results for the basic Lintner model
The results for the basic Lintner model are presented in Table (4) of the
appendix. These results intend to show whether the Lintner model can be
applied to the research problem at hand. Part one of Table (4) shows the
results for the pooled Tobit estimator (balanced panel). Short-run Tobit
coecients as well as short-run APEs are given. This estimator does not
model the panel structure and thus might lead to an upward bias in the
degree of state dependence (dividend smoothing) as outlined in (2.3.1). The
statistically highly signicant coecient of the lagged dependent variable,
the corresponding speed of adjustment coecient and the target payout
ratio are 0.50 (APE of 0.20), 0.50 (0.80) and 0.52 (0.13), respectively. These
results imply that the gap between actual and target payout ratio is reduced
by 50 percent after 1 (0.43) year(s).
Part two of Table (4) shows the results derived applying the Wooldridge-
estimator (Chamberlain-approach). Modelling unobserved rm heterogene-
ity in dividend payments indeed leads to a drop in the coecient on the
lagged dependent variable and of the APE to 0.11 and 0.04, respectively.
Accordingly, the speed of adjustment coecient increases to 0.89 (APE of
0.96) and the median lag decreases to 0.31 (0.22) years. The target payout
ratio falls and is about 0.31 (0.12).
Part three of the Table shows the results using the Mundlak-approach.
Applying this approach does not alter the results. Finally, the impact of
using a balanced panel is analyzed in the model shown in the nal column,
which is based on the pooled Tobit estimator and the unbalanced panel in
which aliates that are in the sample for at least three consecutive years
from 1999 to 2005 are included. The coecients are similar to those shown
in part one (balanced panel). This suggests that sample selection problems
are of minor importance here.
Hence, these results imply that once we have controlled for unobserved
time-invariant rm-specic time invariant eects dividend smoothing is less
an issue for German multinational rms' dividend policy. The eects of
13disequilibrating shocks are absorbed rather quickly. However, one has to
bear in mind that the coecient on the initial condition (DIVit0) is positive
and highly statistically signicant. Thus, rms paying higher dividends at
the beginning of the sample period also have higher expected dividend pay-
ments. This represents an additional channel of inertia in dividends paid.
Most importantly however, the results imply that the Lintner model seems to
be valid for analyzing cross-border intra-rm dividend payments. Yet, com-
pared to studies analyzing the public shareholder sphere, the target-payout
ratio is lower and the speed of adjustment is higher. From a more sub-
stantive perspective these dierences are in line with the view that, for the
parent-subsidiary sphere, dividend payments are less relevant for signalling
and controlling (agency) aims. Other instruments like detailed informa-
tion on balance sheet positions or internal reporting systems and incentive
schemes (e.g. internal job promotion) are available to parent companies to
monitor and inuence the performance and the behavior of their aliates'
managers. Dividend smoothing and target payout ratios should be lower for
cross-border intra-rm dividend decisions.
3 Do taxes have an impact on the amount of div-
idends repatriated?
After having established that the Lintner model is applicable for the cross-
border intra-rm case, the model has to be augmented to capture the eect
additional variables exert upon dividend payments. However, before the
augmented Lintner model is presented and the various variables used in
the estimation are introduced, a brief summary of related literature on the
impact dividend taxes exert on dividend payments is given.
3.1 Dividend taxes and intra-rm dividend payments - Sur-
vey of the empirical literature
Literature on the impact of dividend taxes on dividend remittances with a
focus on German MNEs is scarce. The use of holding companies and owner-
ship chains of German companies' outward FDI, i.e. indirect participating
interests (Lipponer, 2008) including partial ownership, has recently been ex-
plored by Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008). Ownership chains are inter alia
used for the \routing" of dividends across third countries in order to lower
the tax burden. The ndings of Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) show the
importance of withholding taxes as a determinant for the design of own-
ership chains of German MNEs. Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) further
argue that the gains from using holdings and ownership chains may be ex-
pected to be larger for protable rms that pay large dividends. Thus, one
may expect holding companies to be usually used by rms with large prots,
14as gains in the form of avoided dividend taxes are high. Thus, establishing
a tax eect on dividend payments, even in the case of holding companies
excluded from the analysis, as we have done in this study, would emphasize
the importance of withholding taxes for repatriation decisions. Hence, this
study presents evidence complementary to that given in Weichenrieder and
Mintz (2008). Note that Weichenrieder and Mintz also base their analysis
on the MiDi database. However, they do not directly model dividends as a
function of dividend taxes.
Although not explicitly referring to the Lintner model, some empirical
literature which aims to determine the sensitivity of dividend repatriations
to tax costs emerged in the US. This literature increasingly focusses on
alternatives to dividend repatriations19, which \is a costly alternative from
a tax perspective" (Altshuler and Grubert, 2002, p. 74). The standard
model employed by these studies can be summarized as20:
DIVi = 0 + 1Taxi + 2Yi + 3Zi + 4Xi + i (7)
with: DIVi = dividend payment of foreign aliate i to its US parent, Taxi
= tax on dividend payments, Yi = aliate's after tax income; Zi = vector
of other aliate characteristics, Xi = vector of the characteristics of the US
parent, i = error term.
Hines and Hubbard (1990) use US aggregate time series data on repatria-
tions from 1962 to 1982 as well as micro-data from 1984, the former allowing
a dierentiation between various repatriation channels (interest paid to the
parent to service debt capital contributions and royalty payments). For div-
idend payers who are in a decit credit position, the tax on dividends has a
negative eect on distribution. The payout ratio increases by 0.16 percent-
age points upon a one percentage point decrease of the tax variable. Using a
Tobit specication, Altshuler and Newlon (1993) again nd a negative and
signicant impact of the dividend tax on aliates' dividend remittances.
Also, higher aliate net prots increase dividend payments. Evaluated at
the mean, the coecient on the tax variable indicates that an increase in
the tax rate by one percentage point decreases the dividend payout ratio by
0.054 percentage points, which translates into approximately a 1.5 percent
decrease in dividend payments. (ibidem, p. 108)
From the mid-1990s onwards, a series of closely linked papers emerged.
Altshuler et al. (1995a,b) show that the permanent components of tax costs
do not aect dividend payments, while transitory components do. This
result is in line with the \new view of dividend taxation". They also estimate
a Lintner-like model. Based on this model they nd that a reduction in the
tax rate implies an increase in the overall payout ratio (Altshuler et al.,
19E.g., royalties and share repurchases (see Grubert, 1998; Skinner, 2008).
20Note, as most of these studies use cross-sectional data we use the subscript i (aliate
i) instead of it.
151995b, p. 265).
Grubert (1998) challenges these ndings and argues that the results are
due to the omission of alternatives to prot repatriation. Distinguishing
various alternatives to dividends, his ndings suggest that dividends and
other repatriation taxes signicantly alter the composition of payments of
an aliate to its US parent. In particular, the \tax price of dividend repa-
triation discourages dividends, but they do not increase retained earnings."
(ibidem, p. 284) Moreover, including all dividend payments by foreign af-
liates, i.e. not only those paid to their US parents, suggests that even in
countries applying an exemption system (e.g. Germany), the withholding
tax rate enters statistically signicant in his model.
Altshuler and Grubert (2002) add yet other alternatives to dividend
repatriation. Including certain types of triangular relationships, which are
important in the US case, they nd that \the coecient for the local with-
holding tax on dividends is negative, as expected, and highly signicant."
(p. 103)
Following the large and temporary tax cut on dividend income by the US
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 200321, Chetty and Saez
(2005) examine the eects of dividend taxation on payout policies. They
conclude that the rise in regular dividend payments ...oers perhaps the
clearest evidence thus far in the literature that tax policy does matter for
dividend payout policies." (p. 828)
In a further study on the eects of the temporary dividend tax cut of
the US Jobs Growth Act of 2003, Brown et al. (2007), conclude that rms
respond to the tax cut, as the likelihood of a dividend increase following the
tax cut is much higher than prior to 2003.22
An analysis of the eect of repatriation taxes on dividend payments
of US aliates abroad to their US parents based on the Lintner model is
conducted by Desai et al. (2001). They nd that a one percent change in
the dividend tax rate also changes the volume of dividends repatriated by
about one percent. Desai et al. (2001, p. 849) conclude that repatriation
taxes \reduce the volume and eciency of nancial ows between aliates
and their American parents." These results are conrmed in Desai et al.
(2006).
To summarize, the available empirical evidence implies that dividend
taxes do matter for cross-border intra-rm dividend payments. Yet, this
result is predominantly established for countries applying the credit system
in international taxation.
21The US Jobs Growth Act creates a temporary tax holiday that reduces the US tax
rate on repatriations from foreign subsidiaries from 35 percent to 5.25 percent (see Blouin
and Krull, 2008).
22See Blouin and Krull (2008) for details on the characteristics of rms which repatriate
under the US Jobs Growth Act.
163.2 An augmented Lintner model
To analyze the impact taxes and other variables exert on dividend payments
the Lintner model is augmented as follows (see, e.g. Khan, 2006, for a similar
approach):
DIVit = d(DIV 
it   DIVit 1) + it1 (8)
with:
DIV 
it = rProfitit + zTaxjt + wMit + sNjt + hFkt (9)
Substituting and rearranging gives
DIVit = drProfitit+dzTaxjt+d(wMit+sNjt+hFkt)+(1 d)DIVit 1+it
(10)
with: it = ci +t +#it. Thereby, Mit, Njt and Fkt are matrices of variables
capturing additionally relevant determinants of dividends varying over ali-
ates (i), host countries (j) or German industries (k). The long- and short-run
impacts of taxes on dividends are given in Equation (9) and Equation (10),
respectively (z and dz).
3.3 Taxes and additional determinants of dividends
3.3.1 Taxes
In the case of cross-border dividend payments, the relevant dividend tax rate
is not only determined by any withholding tax rates levied by host coun-
tries of FDI on dividends. In addition, one must consider rules contained
in double taxation agreements (DTAs) as well as any unilaterally binding
tax laws. Germany has signed DTAs with all host countries included in our
analysis. Thus, the withholding tax rates on dividends as given in the DTAs
are relevant. Germany applies the exemption method in international taxa-
tion, implying that dividends repatriated are not further taxed in Germany.
Yet, due to stipulations concerning the deductibility of operating costs this
exemption is provided only for 95 percent of the dividends repatriated since
1999.23 Five percent of repatriated dividends are taxed by the German cor-
porate income tax rate (including local business tax rates and the solidarity
23Art. 8b/7 of the German Koerperschaftssteuergesetz (German corporate income tax
law) is introduced via the \Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002" (March 1999). Orig-
inally Art. 8b/7 stipulates that 15 percent of a foreign dividend are eectively taxed due
to stipulations concerning deductibility of operating costs. As these 15 percent were
against the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive this rate was reduced later in 1999 via the
\Steuerbereinigungsgesetz" (Dezember 1999) to 5 percent. In the current German Koer-
perschaftssteuergesetz the stipulations contained in Art. 8b/7 reappeared in Art. 8/5 and
also had a broader focus (from 2002 onwards). Thus, the 95 percent exemption has been
applied in Germany since 1999 (see e.g. German Ministry of Finance, 2008; Leis, 2004;
KPMG, 2007).
17surcharge). Moreover, for EU host countries of German FDI, the Parent-
Subsidiary-Directive (PSD) applies. The latter inter alia stipulates that the
withholding tax rates on dividends be set to zero. Yet, only 14 countries
applied the PSD throughout the whole sample period (the old EU-member
countries), ten countries have applied it from 2004 onwards (the NMS which
joined the EU in 2004) and two EU-member states (Bulgaria and Romania)
have applied the PSD from 2007 onwards. Thus, the applied dividend tax
rate and its variability over time and host countries, respectively, depend on
(i) the host country (EU member country or third country), (ii) the with-
holding tax rate according to the DTA and (iii) the German overall tax rate
on corporate income. The dividend tax rate (Taxjt, in percent) which is
used in the empirical analysis is calculated as:
Taxjt = jt  100 + (100   jt  100)  0:05  DE;t (11)
with: j = withholding tax rate on dividends of host country j according to
DTA (proportion); j is zero if PSD applies; DE = overall corporate income
tax rate of Germany (proportion); 0.05 is due to 95 percent exemption, 100
= assumed gross return of Euro 100 distributed as dividend.24
Dividends are only one means of transferring funds from the subsidiary
to the parent. Another means is share repurchases by the aliate which
are subject to capital gains taxes. Thus, dividend repatriation policy might
also depend on the taxation of share repurchases made by the aliate. It
is likely that dividend payments decrease if the taxation of capital gains is
reduced. To capture the inuence of share repurchases on dividend policy,
we follow Poterba (2004) and apply a \tax discrimination factor" (TDjt) in
our analysis. TDjt measures the net or post-capital gains tax return from
share repurchases in percent of the net or after dividend tax rate dividend
payment (having an equal gross return of Euro 100). With respect to capital
gains taxes, one has to bear in mind that most of the DTAs signed by
Germany preclude a withholding tax on capital gains at source (according to
the Art 13/5 of the OECD-DTA convention; Vogel and Lehner, 1996, 2003,
2008). Moreover, those host countries which have not included Art. 13/5 in
their DTA with Germany (i.e. Australia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Slovak Republic, New Zealand and Norway) also do not levy capital gains
taxes on shares repurchased. Thus, capital gains realized through share
repurchases are not taxed at source. Furthermore, Germany applies the
exemption method in case of capital gains. Yet, as in the case for dividends,
only 95 percent of capital gains received have eectively been exempted since
2004 due to stipulations concerning the deductibility of operating costs (see
German Ministry of Finance, 2008). Thus, for the period until 2004 TDjt
is calculated as:
24For example, Taxjt for j being an old EU member country and t being 2005 is 0 +
(100 - 0)*0.05*0.386 = 1.93 percent.
18TDjt = (
1
(1   jt)  (1   0:05  DE;t)
)  100 (12)
For the years 2004 and 2005 TDjt is calculated as:
TDjt = (
(1   0:05  DE;t)
((1   jt)  (1   0:05  DE;t))
)  100 (13)
with: j = withholding tax rate on dividends of host country j according to
DTA (proportion); j is zero if PSD applies; DE = overall corporate income
tax rate of Germany (proportion); 0.05 is due to 95 percent exemption25.
We expect that a higher Taxjt reduces the expected value of dividends
repatriated, as the Euro value of one unit dividend repatriated is reduced.
Thus, a negative sign of the short- and long-run tax coecient is expected.
Furthermore, as an increase in TDjt implies that transferring funds by share
repurchases is relatively cheaper (in terms of tax burden borne), a negatively
signed coecient of TDjt is expected, too.
3.3.2 Other determinants of dividends
Besides the Lintner-type variables, (DIVi;t 1, Profitit) and the initial divi-
dend payment (DIVit0) we include several variables that have been shown as
important determinants of repatriation policies in theoretical and empirical
papers.
A rst group of determinants of dividends contained in the Mit, Njt and
Fkt matrices in Equation (10) relates to liquidity of the aliate. Internal
and external debt plays a role here: Firms with greater debt ratios and likely
higher claims from interest expense on their earnings are less likely to pay
dividends (Brown et al., 2007, p. 19). Higher debt constrains liquidity and
the tight liquidity position of aliates should then have a negative impact
on the ability and willingness to pay out dividends. Therefore, we use a
rm-specic debt indicator (debtit) of long- and short-run company debt in
the empirical analysis. Note, as an aliate's debt might be simultaneously
determined with dividends paid, the one-year lagged debt variable is used.
A negatively signed coecient is expected.
Note, that debt nancing of aliates might also be used as a device to
control the aliates. Higher debt may reduce agency problems between the
parent company and the aliate in a similar way to dividend payouts (e.g.
Brown et al., 2007, footnote 14). This agency argument is also related to a
country's risk level, as it is usually maintained that an aliate in a culturally
or institutionally distant and/or politically risky country would present a
25For example, Taxjt for j being an old EU member country and t being 2005 is 100 
(1   0:05  0:386)=(100  (1   0)  (1   0:05  0:386))  100 = 100 as j is zero due to the
PSD and the 95 percent exemption applies to foreign dividends and foreign capital gains
in 2005.
19greater agency risk to the parent. Therefore the parent would desire a
higher degree of control of the aliate's investment behavior. \Under such
conditions, the parent might require higher intra-rm dividend payments
[...] than it requires from its other aliates in less risky or more familiar
markets." (Lundan, 2006, p. 57) This argument is conrmed, for example,
by evidence presented in Lehmann and Mody (2004), who nd on the basis
of aggregate data that the payout ratio appears to be lower for less risky
countries. Moreover, Altshuler and Newlon (1993, p. 107) mention that
country risk factors may explain the positive country eects on dividend
remittances for certain countries. Thus, we include a proxy for the level
of a host country's political risk (Riskjt) in the augmented Lintner model.
As the level of risk decreases with an increase in the value of Riskjt, a
negatively signed coecient is expected.26 Note that it is conceivable that
aliates which are partially owned pay higher dividends than wholly-owned
rms, as local inuence is possibly higher in the former (e.g. Desai et al.,
2006). To cope with this channel of agency problems, only wholly-owned
aliates are used in the empirical analysis.
Another group of determinants focusses on investment and growth op-
portunities either in the host or the home country, and is also related to
the liquidity issues discussed above. On the one hand foreign aliates with
attractive investment opportunities may nance their new capital expendi-
tures inter alia by reducing or omitting dividends to their parent companies.
The host country real growth rate (Growthjt) is used to proxy for growth
opportunities of the aliate. Since we include only manufacturing ali-
ates in our analysis, we use the aggregate growth rate of the manufacturing
sector of each host country of German aliates. We expect a negative
relationship with dividends. On the other hand repatriated dividends may
increase if growth opportunities in the home country (Germany) are soaring.
Industry-level real growth rates (Growthkt) are used to capture investment
opportunities in Germany.
The size of the aliate (Sizeit) is considered as another rm-specic
factor determining the expected dividend repatriated. In their empirical
study on UK repatriation, Bond et al. (2005) nd that \larger rms tend
to have higher dividend payout ratios" (p. 60; also see Benito and Young,
2003). This might be due to the higher market power of larger rms which
could ceteris paribus translate into higher dividend payouts. Furthermore,
the size variable may capture the age of the rm, as older rms are larger
and are expected to pay higher dividends due to lower growth opportunities
and larger retained earnings. In a similar vein, Brown et al. (2007) include
rm size among the set of covariates in their study of the eect of executive
26Desai et al. (2004, p. 2467) maintain that aliates located in a high risk country
should be nanced more by local indebtedness and thus lower dividends should follow.
Yet, given the level of debt - as implied by the ceteris paribus condition in an econometric
analysis - a higher country risk should lead to higher dividends.
20stock ownership on dividend payouts, yet no results are displayed on this
variable.27
Table (2) in the appendix also includes the details of the variables used
in the subsequent empirical estimation and Table (5) also displayed in the
appendix shows the descriptive evidence for the additional control variables
used.
3.4 Econometric results for the augmented Lintner model
Applying the Tobit estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005) leads to the
results displayed in Table (6) given in the appendix to the paper. In the
second (based on the Chamberlain-approach; model 1) and the third (based
on the Mundlak-approach; model 2) column results for the full model, in-
cluding all variables discussed above, are given. As the results are robust
with respect to the approach used to model aliate-specic eects, the re-
maining models contained in Table (6) are based on the computationally
simpler Mundlak-approach. Models 3 to 5 dier from model 2 by excluding
insignicant control variables one at a time. Model 6 is our \preferred"
model in the sense that it contains only statistically signicant variables.
Finally, in model 7 the dividend tax rate (Taxjt) is substituted by the tax
discrimination factor, TDjt, which incorporates the taxation of capital gains.
Models 2 to 6 of Table (6) reveal that dividend taxes indeed impact neg-
atively on the expected value of the repatriated dividends from wholly and
directly owned foreign aliates. This is also the case if Taxjt is substituted
by the tax discrimination factor (model 7). An increase in TDjt, which
might arise either if the capital gains tax rate decreases or the dividend tax
rate increases (ceteris paribus), leads to a fall in expected dividends repa-
triated. Thus, using TDjt reinforces the results derived by applying the
dividend tax rate.
Concerning the control variables included, the Lintner-type variables
(lagged dividend and current year's earnings) and the initial dividend pay-
ment as well as an aliate's size and indebtedness enter statistically sig-
nicant. The proxies capturing the growth opportunities as well as a host
country's political risk level fall short of statistical signicance. Due to the
relatively high level of political stability in the host countries included, the
insignicance of Riskjt is not unexpected. Moreover, the insignicance of
Growthkt might be an indication for the rather poor growth performance of
Germany over the majority of years considered in the analysis. The insignif-
icance of Growthjt is somewhat unexpected. It might be an indication of
the location of many German aliates in countries where growth is rather
sluggish during the sample period. Moreover, the inclusion of a full set of
27Note that most of the models estimated also include Forexjt as dened above as an
additional variable in the Njt matrix.
21time dummies might partly capture the eect of both variables, Growthjt
and Growthkt.
Table (6) gives an impression which variables impact signicantly (pos-
itively or negatively) on repatriated dividends. Yet, in order to derive the
economic eects of these variables, APEs are more useful than Tobit co-
ecients. The second and third column of Table (7) show the short- und
long-run APEs derived based on model 6 of Table (6).
Using the short-run APEs shown in column two of Table 7 implies that
a one percentage point decrease in the dividend tax rate increases the con-
ditional expectation of dividend payments by about 43 thsd. Euro. This
result implies that, if Germany would abandon the taxation of 5 percent
of dividends repatriated which leads to a decrease of the dividend tax rate
from about 2 percent to zero for EU member host countries, dividends repa-
triated by foreign aliates in these countries would increase by about 86
thsd. Euro.
Evaluating the eect of a one percentage point decrease in the dividend
tax rate at the overall mean value of dividends repatriated by aliates (1.2
mn Euro) implies a semi-elasticity of dividends with respect to the dividend
tax rate of about -3.5 (calculated as -43/1215*100). In the long-run the eect
increases slightly to about 45 thsd. Euro (cf. column three of Table 7) or a
semi-elasticity of about -3.7. If the mean of positive dividend payments (2.7
mn Euro) is used the semi-elasticities derived are -1.6 and -1.7, respectively.
3.5 Robustness checks
The remaining columns of Table (7) (models 8 and 9) include further robust-
ness checks. Model 8 gives estimates for the preferred model 6 being esti-
mated using the Chamberlain-approach rather than the Mundlak-approach.
Again, the results are robust with respect to the way aliate-specic eects
are modelled. Model 9 shows that the substantive results already contained
in model 6 of Table (6) do not change if we use \converted" balance sheet
data to derive the dividend variable instead of using Forexjt as an additional
control variable. The estimated tax eect remains statistically signicant
and it increases (in absolute value) from -117 (model 6) to -155 (model 9).
Finally, note that the coecients of the Lintner-type variables as well as the
coecient of the initial dividend payment are also in this case in line with
the results displayed in Table (4).
4 Summary
The aim of this study is to explore whether dividend tax rates have a statis-
tically and economically relevant impact on the expected value of dividend
repatriated from foreign wholly-owned manufacturing aliates to their Ger-
man parent company over the 1999-2005 period. The study is based on
22the Lintner model. As this model does not directly model cross-border
intra-rm dividend payments, in a rst step the empirical relevance of the
Lintner model for such cases is analyzed. Then the basic Lintner model
is augmented to capture the eects of additional variables on the expected
dividend payment. Our results imply that dividend taxation has an impact
on rms' payout policies. Specically, we derive a semi-elasticities of about
-3.5 (evaluated at the overall mean) and -1.6 (evaluated at the mean of posi-
tive dividends), respectively, implying that a one percentage point change in
the dividend tax rate will change dividends repatriated by 3.5 (1.6) percent.
It has to be stressed, that our analysis is based on direct participations in
the manufacturing sector only. Thus, the analysis complements the results
derived by Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008), which show that dividend taxes
impact on the location of holding companies and the structure of interna-
tional ownership chains by German MNEs in general. Holding companies are
predominantly used to channel prots of highly protable aliates. Thus,
establishing a tax eect even in case of direct participations underlines the
role of dividend taxes for repatriation decisions of rms.
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27Appendix: Tables
Table 1: : Overview of main studies using the Lintner model
Personal shareholder sphere Speed of Averaged long-run Median
(selected studies) adjustment payout ratio adjustment lag
OLS
Lintner 1956 (AER)*) 0.30 0.50 1.94
Fama and Babiak 1968 (JASA) 0.40 0.38 1.36
Van Eije and Megginson 2008 (JFE) 0.57 0.44 0.82
Skinner 2008 (JCF) 0.18 0.61 3.49
Behm and Zimmermann 1993 (ZWS; 0.16 0.52 4.12
for DE)
Da Silva et al. 2004 (OUP, for DE) 0.22 0.40 2.73
Andres et al. 2009 (JEF, for DE) 0.21 0.27 2.96
Average across 32 studies 0.44 0.40 1.89
Intra-rm dividends Speed of Averaged long-run Median
adjustment payout ratio adjustment lag
OLS
Lehmann and Mody 2004 (IMF, 0.65 0.23 0.66
for DE)
Desai et al. 2001 (NTJ) 0.73 0.56 0.53
Desai et al. 2006 (FM) 0.77 0.48 0.47
Desai et al. 2006 (FM) 0.53 0.61 0.91
Average across 4 studies 0.70 0.38 0.60
Tobit
Desai et al. 2001 (NTJ) 0.67 0.88 0.62
Desai et al. 2006 (FM) 0.77 0.37 0.47
DE = Germany
*) see list of references for full name of Journals.
28Table 2: Denition and sources of variables
Expected
Abbreviation Data Source Variable Sign
DIVit Dependent variable; calculated
on the basis of the MiDi
database of the Deutsche Bun-
desbank
Derived dividend payments of
German wholly-owned aliates
abroad to their German parent
companies in Euro 1.000
Explanatory variables: Firm level
DIVit0 Initial value of the dependent
variable; calculated on the ba-
sis of the MiDi database of the
Deutsche Bundesbank
Derived dividend payments of
German wholly-owned aliates
abroad to their German parent
companies in Euro 1.000 in 1999
+
DIVit 1 Lagged dependent variable +
Profitit Calculated on the basis of the
MiDi database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank
Variable p32, Prot and loss for
the nancial year (after taxes,
prior to prot distribution, and
osetting of losses carried for-
ward) of aliate I, in Euro 1000
+
Debtit MiDi database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank
Liabilities (p33) and other lia-
bilities (p39) of aliate i as per-
cent of balance sheet total (p40)
-
Debtit 1 MiDi database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank
Liabilities (p33) and other lia-
bilities (p39) of aliate i as per-
cent of balance sheet total (p40)
-
Sizeit MiDi database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank
Number of employees (pk05) of
aliate i
+
Explanatory variables: Industry and country level
Growthkt EUKLEMS database Real annual industry growth
rate of value added in German
industry k; EUKLEMS variable
GO QI
+
Growthjt OECD, supplemented by WIIW
database
Real annual growth rate of value
added in manufacturing sector
of host country j; EUKLEMS
variable GO QI
-
TAXjt Double Taxation Agreements
(European Tax Handbook),
EU-Parent Subsidiary Di-
rective; German Ministry of
Finance (2008)
Dividend tax on repatriation of
income from host country j to
Germany
-
TDjt Double Taxation Agreements
(European Tax Handbook),
EU-Parent Subsidiary Di-
rective, Vogel and Lehner
(2008), German Ministry of
Finance(2008)
Ratio of net capital gains and
net dividends received upon
repatriation of 100 Euro of
funds from host country j to
Germany
-
Riskjt Euromoney Political risk index of host coun-
try j ranging from zero (highest
risk level) to 25 (lowest possible
risk level)
-
Forexjt MiDi database of the Deutsche
Bundesbank
Forward lag of change in bilat-
eral Euro exchange rate
n.i.
Note: n.i. = not interpreted as this variable is included to cope with the exchange rate



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 7: APEs and regression results for additional versions of the aug-
mented Lintner model
Approach/ SR-APE LR-APE Chamberlain Mundlak
Variable (model 8) (model 9)
DIVit 1 0.035* 0.081** 0.053*
(0.019) (0.032) (0.032)
DIVit0 0.126*** 0.130 0.271*** 0.245***
(0.017) (0.050) (0.044)
Profitit 0.113*** 0.117 0.322*** 0.265***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
Sizeit 1.123* 1.164 3.007*** 3.620***
(0.589) (1.024) (1.015)
Taxjt -43.393** -44.949 -105.157* -155.173**
(19.210) (62.590) (73.004)
Debtit 1 -17.180*** -17.797 -47.516*** -34.784***
(3.604) (8.528) (8.183)
Forexjt n.i. n.i. 157.029***
(16.231)
Obs. 3522 3522 Yes 3138
Firms 587 587 3522 523
Notes: *** / ** / * = signicant at 1% / 5% / 10%; Time dummies are
included; Standard errors in parentheses; j = host country j; i = aliate
i; t = year; APE = Average Partial Eect; Standard errors derived
using a non-parametric bootstrap-approach with 50 replications; SR /
LR = short / long-run coecients; Forexjt = forward lag of the change
in the average bilateral Euro exchange rate; n.i = not interpreted as this
variable is included to cope with the exchange rate stability problem
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